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[The following article opens up an important question: Should
juvenile murderers be subject to the jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts?
There is one school of thought that would give exclusive jurisdiction
over all juvenile offenders, including juvenile murderers to the Juvenile
Courts. Another group would have a concurrent jurisdiction to the extent
that the Juvenile Court would have absolute discretion in either, retaining
a juvenile offender for a hearing before it, or transfer the case to the
Criminal Court for trial. If a juvenile is sixteen years of age and has
been a repeater and violated his probation several times the Juvenile
Court might deem it expedient to have such a juvenile tried for his
latest violation in a Criminal Court. A third view, illustrated by Illinois,
gives the State's Attorney authority to elect whether to try a juvenile
offender in either the Criminal Court or the Juvenile Court. The latter
is called the Family Court in Cook County, Illinois, since 1949. In
that state some juvenile murderers have been tried in the Juvenile Court
(Family Court) while others have been tried in the Criminal Court.
Though the trial is in the Juvenile Court the juvenile offender can
demand a jury trial composed of a six-member jury. In some cases a
juvenile is found not guilty in the Criminal Court and then tried in
Juvenile Court, found guilty and incarcerated.
The Illinois court has jurisdiction to try adults contributing to the
delinquency of a juvenile and also the juvenile offender-a rather significant development.
The Illinois Court has jurisdiction to try adults contributing to the
years of age are considered juveniles. Juveniles from the age of ten
years are likewise recognized as being within the Criminal Code and
thus criminally liable for its violation.-John W. Curran,Ed.]
Although children's courts had been established in Australia in the
early nineties it was not until 1899, when the State of Illinois enacted
enabling legislation, that such courts were incorporated into American
jurisprudence. Prior to the establishment of such courts, it had been the
practice in this country to hale juvenile lawbreakers before the criminal
courts and to brand them with the stigma of a criminal charge. Those
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who were found guilty were either punished or placed on probation.
Although the theory of probation aimed at the rehabilitation of the
youthful offenders and their return to society as useful, law abiding
citizens, the efforts to that end were always stultified and in many instances completely frustrated by the psychological effect of their experience with the law on the impressionable minds of the young culprits.
The equitable nature of juvenile courts has been comprehensively set
forth in the much quoted case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.
Fisher."
The success which attended the establishment of juvenile courts has
not failed to impress politically-minded legislatures. Their response
to the popularity of these courts has found expression in their attempts
to broaden the jurisdiction of the courts. On the other hand, the judiciary has zealously guarded the jurisdiction of the criminal courts from
the inroads of such legislation whenever the unconstitutionality of such
legislation was indicated. In the main, however, the criminal courts
have been shorn of their jurisdiction over youthful offenders with respect
to all offenses except murder and treason. This, the question of the
treatment of cases involving juveniles charged with the crime of murder,
is the subject of our inquiry.
Nowhere, perhaps, has the jurisdictional conflict between criminal
and juvenile courts been more warmly contested or more clearly re2
solved than in the State of New Jersey.
But the courts have gone beyond the mere refusal to accept a guilty
plea, for the decisions hold that evidence of such a plea may not be
3
introduced in the trial of an accused person.
Finally they have gone so far as to hold that the improper introduction of evidence of this nature constituted sufficient grounds for the
Appellate Court to declare a mistrial, notwithstanding the failure of
4
defendant's counsel to enter an objection and exception on the record.
Broad considerations of the basic nature of the crime of murder
having been disposed of, it may now be appropriate to turn our attention to the statute creating and defining the jurisdiction of Juvenile
Courts in New Jersey.5
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

213 Pa. 48, 62A. 198.
Genz v. State, N.J.L. 459, 31A. 1037.
State v. Smith, 109 N.J.L. 532, 162A. 752.
State v. Leaks, 124 N.J.L. 261, 10A. 2d 281 N.J.S.A., 9:18-12.
For the development of Juvenile Court jurisdiction and its variations, see the follow-

ing cases:
Ex parte Daniecki, 117 N.J.E. 527, 177A. 91.
In re Mei, 122 N.J.E. 125.
Richardson v. State Board of Control, etc., 99 N.J.L. 516.
State v. Goldberg, 124 N.J.L. 272, 11A. 2d 299.
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The result in New Jersey is typical of the result in New York and
Illinois and other jurisdictions when a juvenile murder case arises in
spite of enlightened thinking that the juvenile delinquent should not be
treated as a criminal in a criminal court.
The first thought which arises upon a reading of the opinion in the
Goldberg case is, that here is grudging admission that our judiciary
realized that the benefits and constitutional advantages of the juvenile
court act outweighed the constitutionual disadvantages or defects, and
felt constrained, therefore, to erect a barrier in cases involving the
crime of murder. The opinion in this case, significantly, was written
by Justice Case, who delivered the opinion also for the Court of Errors
and Appeals in the Mei case, and who consequently participated in the
deliberations of the court on that occasion. The second thought evoked
by the opinion is that the courts, although admitting the protective
advantages afforded to the child by the juvenile court, "make confusion
more confounded" by saying in effect: "The child needs this court to
correct his erring ways, but if he errs too greatly, this court cannot
open its doors to him." Dr. Ralph S. Banay, Associate Director, Research on Social Deviations, New York, commenting on the inherent
contradiction in such reasoning in an article in a recent issue of Federal
Probation entitled "Homicide Among Children," makes this pertinent
observation:
"The apparent philosophy behind statutes concerning juvenile offenders is that
a child has not reached a degree of intellectual and emotional development that
would qualify him as fully responsible for his acts. The laws, however, embody
an obvious contradiction; for when the offense is too obnoxious or repugnant, complete responsibility is placed upon the child and he must face the full weight of
the law."
That it was the intention of the New Jersey legislature not to except
the crime of murder from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is indicated by the course of subsequent legislation. In 1943 an amendment
was enacted raising the age of children under such jurisdiction from
sixteen to eighteen years and adding the following provisions:
"If it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that the case of any person
between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years should not be dealt with by the court,
either because of the fact that the person is an habitual offender, or has been
charged with an offense of a heinous nature, under circumstances which may require
the imposition of a sentence rather than the disposition permitted by this chapter
for the welfare of society, then the court may refer such case to the prosecutor of
the pleas of the county where the court is situate.
"Such case will thereafter be dealt with in exactly the same manner as any
other criminal case involving an adult offender.
"Any offender between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years may demand a
presentment and trial by jury and, in such case shall be referred to the prosecutor
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of the pleas and dealt with in exactly the same manner as any other criminal case
involving an adult offender. Every case so referred shall be accompanied by all
documents pertaining thereto."

Although the first of the three foregoing quoted paragraphs does not
mention the crime of "murder" by name, it requires but a modicum of
mental acumen to appreciate that the legislature meant "murder" and
was inhibited from giving utterance to it by the umbrage resulting from
the Daniecki and Mei opinions. It remains to be seen whether, in view
of the clear legislative intent as expressed in the amendment, the New
Jersey courts will hereafter modify their position with respect to the
jurisdiction of juvenile courts in murder cases, or if they will continue
to hold fast to a philosophy which attempts to justify an untenable
position.
In what way, if any, the courts of New Jersey have been influenced
by decisions in the sister state across the Hudson is difficult to say, because there is virtually no reference to the New York precedents in the
cases we have thus far considered. This may stem from the fact that
there is no uniformity in the enabling legislation on the subject, such
as may be found in the statutes of the several states on other subjects.
The Children's Court Act of the State of New York was enacted pursuant to the provision of the state constitution that "the Legislature may
establish Children's Courts and may confer upon them such jurisdiction
as may be necessary for the correction, protection, guardianship and
disposition of delinquent, neglected or dependent minors." 6 The Children's Court Acts give the Children's Courts exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and determine the cases of children under the age of sixteen years
who are charged with juvenile delinquency. The extent of this jurisdiction has ben lucidly set forth in the case of People v. Murch as follows:
"The legislative history of those sections, as well as the unmistakable implications of the language used, show a clear intent to remove from the category of
crime any and all lawbreaking acts committed by a child between the ages of seven
and sixteen years, except those punishable by death or life imprisonment. The conclusive presumption of incapacity which has always existed in the case of a child
under seven years of age is, as to those acts, now applied to a child between the
stated ages . . . The result is that the only crimes which a child under sixteen

years of age is capable of committing are treason, murder in the first degree and
murder in the second degree; and that as to those crimes alone, in the case of such
a child, have the criminal courts jurisdiction."
Since the decision just quoted rested largely on the previous decision
of the New York Court of Appeals in the case of People v. Roper,8 it
6.
7.
8.

Laws of 1922, c. 547, amended by Laws of 1930, c. 393.
263 N.Y. 285, 189 N.E. 220.
259 N.Y. 170, 181 N.E. 88.
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will be helpful to quote briefly from the opinion of Lehman,
latter case:

J.,

in the

"Upon the trial of a child under the age of sixteen, the participation of a child
in a robbery or at least in a robbery in the second or third degrees, would not
establish the guilt of a felony, but only of a minor offense characterized as juvenile
delinquency. Hence, it is plain that the defendant's conviction rests upon no finding of guilt of a felony, and thus no finding of felonious intent, and the judgment
must be reversed . . . A child under sixteen can be guilty of murder in the first
or second degrees where he kills a man with felonious intent, but such felonious
intent is not established without both proof and finding of intent to kill or of guilt
of an independent felony during which the homicide occurred."
The temper of the decisions in New York since the Roper and Murch
cases has been to extend the application of the "felonious intent" philosophy even further, by the use of such expressions as "design murder."
An illustration of recent judicial reasoning on this subject is the case of
9 which was decided in 1945 in the King's County Court
People v. Porter,
of New York, from which the following significant comments are quoted:
"While all four defendants move to dismiss the indictment, the only serious
question is raised by the three defendants who are under the age of 16-Porter,
Washington and Skinner. It is contended on their behalf that at most this is a
felony murder, and under our statutes and decisions persons under the age of 16
may not be convicted of a felony murder but only of what is often designated as a
design murder i.e. with a design to effect death.' 0
"This contention is correct. It is settled law that a youth under sixteen may
not be deemed guilty of any crime-but of juvenile delinquency-if he commits
'any act or omission which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime not
punishable by death or life imprisonment.' Penal Law No. 2186. That being so, a
murder prosecution is not warranted, nor a murder conviction justified by proof
that the victim was killed while the youth was engaged in committing a felony.
In other words, although an adult may be convicted of first degree murder on
proof that a killing occurs in the course of a felony upon which he is engaged, a
fifteen year old youth may not be so adjudged, unless there is proof that he intended
to kill."3
"Unless there is sufficient evidence before the Grand Jury that Porter, Washington and Skinner intended to kill, the indictment against them should be dismissed.
In this brief survey, it has been the purpose of the writer to point
up the sharp conflict between the conservative forces of established law
as exemplified in the judicial decisions and the progressive dynamism

inherent in the program of sociologists, as evidenced in the extension
of legislation in behalf of juvenile offenders. The developments in New
York as well as in New Jersey indicate how the conflict will be resolved.

It would serve no useful purpose in this article to review at length
9. 54 N.Y. 2d 3.
10. Penal Law No. 1044, sub. 1, and No. 1046.
11. People v. Murch, 263 N.Y. 285, 189 N.E. 220; People v. Roper, 1932, 259 N.Y. 170,
181 N.E. 88.
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the judicial decisions of other states, for none of them presents a judicial
philosophy worthy of comment. For the most part these states have
taken a position which straddles the issue as to the treatment of juvenile
offenders in murder cases. To the reader, who may be interested in
pursuing the examination into the subject further, it is suggested that
the very recent case of Snyder v. State, 56 A. 2d. 485, Court of Appeals
of Maryland, will bring him up to November, 1947 with a review of
the pertinent decisions.

